What to know about China's 2026 National Defense Mobilization Law

Key points

China's National Defense Mobilization Law (国防动员法) was revised by the NPC Standing Committee on 28 August 2026 and takes effect on 1 October 2026. The law governs how China converts civilian economic capacity into military capability during wartime to ensure a rapid transition for national defence. Critically, the law specifies that China may mobilise its national defence for threats to national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security, and even "development interests." The revisions significantly expand the law's scope and formalise several Military-Civil Fusion principles that were previously scattered policies rather than unified national statute. Among the changes is a call for national defence mobilisation through the advanced technology sector.

What happened

On Friday, 28 August 2026, China's National People's Congress drafted a new revised version of the National Defense Mobilization Law (国防动员法). Through 14 chapters and 82 articles, the amendments to the law established four major themes:

In the lead-up to the revisions' announcement, the NPC Legislative Affairs Commission spokesperson Huang Haihua (黄海华) explicitly focused on the need to "promote the application of advanced technologies and to develop national defence mobilisation capabilities in emerging fields."

What this means

The 2026 revision of China's National Defense Mobilization Law represents a clear push to bring China's high-tech sectors into the fold during wartime. China has made massive strides in the past twenty years towards upgrading their military away from a massed infantry doctrine towards a highly capable and technologically advanced joint fighting force. Towards this end, China's civilian sectors have been invaluable in contributing advanced breakthroughs and industrial might to the military through the policy of Military-Civil Fusion. The recent revisions to the National Defense Mobilization Law further cement this role and its obligations during wartime.

The 2026 version of the law is littered with articles clearly outlining what is expected of China's technology sector to participate during wartime. For example, the new Articles Seven and Eight establish a "data service and support system" to collect and utilise data related to national defence, and promote national defence mobilisation capabilities in emerging fields and advanced technology respectively. Additionally, Article 45 sets a "mobilisation system for the scientific research, production, and maintenance support of military products" as well as a "reserve of capacity for such activities." Coupled with Articles 40, 41, and 46, which work to establish a strategic materials stockpile and a military supply chain security assessment respectively, these provisions suggest China fully understands the power of weaponised technology supply chains, wants to draw civilian breakthroughs into the military sphere, and seeks to insulate itself from international actions. Finally, these obligations throughout the civilian ecosystem are explicitly stated in Article 60. It stipulates clearly that any entities in "transportation, telecommunications, cybersecurity, medicine, engineering and construction, energy and chemicals, large-scale water conservancy facilities, civil nuclear facilities, news media, national defence research and production, and municipal infrastructure support" are inherently obligated to undertake national defence support tasks and engage in training during peacetime.

Because of this, any organisation in the fields listed above is expected to already be preparing for how it can contribute to the PLA and China's wartime mobilisation. Article 60 in particular is alarming given the breadth of its scope definitions to touch upon many sectors that appear innocuous. Coupled with the renewed focus on advanced technology, understanding China's MCF ecosystem has never been a more pressing concern.

Key articles and their significance

Article 7 Data Service Support System (new). Creates a legal "data service support system" for defence mobilisation. The state now has explicit statutory authority to collect and use any data "closely related to defence mobilisation" from any Chinese entity. This removes any meaningful legal firewall between civilian Chinese companies and the state's military data requirements. For clients assessing whether a Chinese counterparty's data is genuinely ring-fenced from the PLA, this law makes the answer clearly no.

Article 8 Emerging technology (new). Brings AI and other advanced technologies explicitly into the mobilisation framework. "New domain defence mobilisation forces" are now a statutory category. This has direct relevance for clients tracking Chinese technology companies.

Article 29 Construction Projects and Products. Any construction project or product on the catalogue jointly issued by NDRC and CMC must embed military requirements in its design, production, and maintenance. Companies participating in those projects through procurement bids will receive support in implementing these military requirements. This change expands the legally defined scope of MCF-obligated entities considerably beyond what prior policy documents covered.

Article 45 Scientific Research Mobilization. Sets a "mobilisation system for the scientific research, production, and maintenance support of military products" as well as a "reserve of capacity for such activities."

Article 46 Military supply chain security assessments (new). The State Council and CMC must now conduct formal security assessments of military product supply chains and take measures to strengthen their resilience. Taken with Articles 40 and 41, which establish a strategic materials stockpile, this demonstrates that China is mapping its own dual-use supply chains and ensuring access to key enabling technologies throughout prolonged periods of conflict.

Article 60 National Defense Service. The following sectors are legally obligated to provide defence services upon mobilisation: transport, postal, telecom, network security, medical, food supply, construction, energy and chemicals, large water facilities, civilian nuclear facilities, news media, defence R&D and production, and municipal infrastructure. Any Chinese company operating in these sectors is, by law, a defence asset once mobilisation is declared.

Chapter 10 Requisition, Expropriation, and Compensation Regarding Civil Resources. All civilian resources (facilities, equipment, vehicles, premises) can be requisitioned once mobilisation is declared, with only personal necessities and care institution assets exempt. For investment screening and M&A due diligence clients with exposure to Chinese counterparties, this represents a significant risk.